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Summary
The paper focuses on the post mortem mandate, an agreement used to protect 
some interests arising after the mandator’s death, both in Italian legal system 
and in Roman Law. Given that the latest doctrine has considered invalid a 
post mortem mandate where the nature of the mandatory’s tasks is economic, 
as it does not comply with art. 458 Cod. Civ., this article explores the issues 
suggesting that the recent introduction of the ‘reverse mortgage’ within the 
Italian legal system could be considered as a new step towards overcoming 
the prohibition of agreements as to succession. After analysing the current 
legislation, also within the framework of European private law, the research 
dwells on post mortem mandatum in Roman law, trying to show that such 
consensual contract could be considered as a succession agreement. After 
having demonstrated the difference between the mandatum post mortem 
(understood as a contract) and other testamentary dispositions defined as 
mandatum post mortem as well, a source showing the possible economic nature 
of the Roman mandatum post mortem is considered, to conclude that there 
were Roman law cases, like that of Gaio in D. 17.1.13, proving the existence of 
bilateral agreements intended to fulfil an economic function casually related to 
the mandator’s death.
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1. THE POST MORTEM MANDATE IN ITALIAN LAW AND 
THE RECENT INTRODUCTION OF REVERSE MORTGAGE
Within the Italian legal system, the post mortem mandate is an agreement used 
to protect some interests arising after the mandator’s death1. This is one of the so-
called “alternatives to the Will”2 and is widely used, for example, for decisions on 
the deceased’s funeral,3 in the field of copyrights and intellectual property rights and 
for the management of the deceased’s electronic accounts4. 
The rules and the validity framework to be applied to this agreement are laid 
down by the doctrine and the case-law,5 in the light of the mandate contract as 
reference. 
Clearly, the post mortem mandate posed systematic coherence problems: the 
post mortem mandate is indeed to be considered mainly in accordance with Italian 
succession law and, so, with art. 458 cod. civ., banning agreements as to succession.6 
In providing a simple definition of “agreements as to succession” we might 
say that they are agreements which confer, modify or withdraw, with or without 
1 On post mortem mandate in Italian civil law, see N. Di Staso, Il mandato ‘post mortem 
exequendum’, in Fam. Pers. Succ., 2011, 685 ff.; F.A. Moncalvo, Sul mandato da eseguirsi 
dopo la morte del mandante, in Fam. Pers. Succ., I, 2010, 56 ff.; G. Capozzi, Successioni 
e donazioni, I, Milano, 1983, 37; A.A. Dolmetta, Patti successori istitutivi. Mandato ‘post 
mortem’. Contratto di mantenimento, in Vita notarile, 2011, I.2, 453 ff.; A. Ansaldo, In tema 
di mandato ‘post mortem’. Nota a Cass. sez. I civ. 23 maggio 2006, n. 12143, in NGCC, 2007, 
I, 496 ff.; G. Bonilini, Una valida ipotesi di mandato ‘post mortem’. Nota a Trib. Palermo 
sez. I civ. 16 marzo 2000, in I Contratti, XII, 2000, 1101 ff.; F. Gradassi, Mandato ‘post 
mortem’, in Contratto e Impresa, 1990, 827 ff.; M. Des Loges, Il mandato ‘post mortem’, in 
Il notaro, 1970, XXIV, 115 f.
2  See A. Palazzo, Istituti alternativi al testamento, Napoli, 2003; V. Putortì, I contratti ‘post 
mortem’, in Rassegna di diritto civile, 2012, III, 768 ff.; A. Rosa, Successione testamentaria 
e istituti alternativi al testamento, in Il Nuovo diritto, 2006, VII-VIII.1, 720 ff.; L. Santoro, 
Le alternative al testamento, in Contratto e impresa, 2003, III, 1187 ff.; M.R. Marella, Il 
divieto dei patti successori e le alternative convenzionali al testamento, in NGCC, 1991, II, 
91 ff.
3  See G. Musolino, Le disposizioni sulla sepoltura fra testamento e mandato ‘post mortem’. 
Nota a Cass. sez. I civ. 23 maggio 2006, n. 12143, in Rivista del notariato, 2007, III.2, 690 ff.; 
C.M. Bianca, Diritto civile, II, La Famiglia. Le successioni, Milano, 2002, 419; G. Bonilini, 
Iscrizione a ‘società’ di cremazione e mandato ‘post mortem’, in Fam. Pers. Succ., VI, 2007, 
524 ff.
4  A. Magnani, L’eredità digitale, in Notariato, V, 2014, 519 ff.; Studio 6-2007/IG della 
Commissione Studi di Informatica Giuridica del CNN, ‘Password’, credenziali e 
successione ‘mortis causa’, in Diritto dell’internet, VI, 2007; L. Di Lorenzo, Il legato 
di ‘password’, in Notariato, 2014, II, 144 ff.; G. Resta, La ‘morte’ digitale, in Il Diritto 
dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 2014, VI, 891 ff.; U. Bechini, ‘Password’, credenziali e 
successione ‘mortis causa’, in Studi e materiali, 2008, I, 279 ff.
5  C. Cecere, Il divieto dei patti successori nella giurisprudenza, in Diritto privato, 1998, IV, 
343 ff.
6  See V. Putortì, Mandato ‘post mortem’ e divieto dei patti successori, in Obbligazioni e 
Contratti, XI, 2012, 737 ff.
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consideration, rights to the future succession of one or more persons who are party 
to the agreement.
So, with respect to the possible contrast with the Italian ban of succession 
agreements, it has to be pointed out that, in order to be valid, the post mortem 
mandate has to be revocable (and this seldom poses problems, as revocability is 
part of the typical mandate structure7) and must have no economic nature8. The 
latest doctrine has considered invalid the so-called mortis causa mandate, a contract 
where the nature of the mandatory’s tasks is economic: it is null as it does not 
comply with art. 458 cod. civ.9.
On the other hand, the post mortem mandate is valid when the nature of the 
mandatory’s tasks is merely material and the contract do not have economic nature 
(so-called post mortem exequendum mandate).10
Since the line between a valid post mortem mandate (which is a contract 
without patrimonial nature) and a void succession agreement is very fine, I contend 
that the recent introduction of the reverse mortgage within the Italian legal system 
could be considered as a new step towards overcoming the prohibition of succession 
agreements. 
2. THE ITALIAN REVERSE MORTGAGE AND ITS 
COMPATIBILITY WITH ART. 458 COD. CIV.
The Italian prestito vitalizio ipotecario is a type of mortgage introduced with 
Law 44/2015 in which a homeowner, 60 years old or older, can borrow money 
against the value of his home. No repayment of the mortgage is required until the 
borrower dies or the home is sold. The home serves as collateral and it must be sold 
in order to repay the mortgage when the borrower dies.11
7  Art. 1722, 1° co., n. 2, cod. civ.
8  See V. Putortì, Disposizioni ‘mortis causa’ a contenuto non patrimoniale e potere di revoca 
da parte degli eredi, in Rassegna di diritto civile, 2014, III, 787 ff.
9  See G. Capozzi, Successioni, cit., 62 ff.
10  A third type is the so-called post mortem mandate ‘in senso stretto’ (in its strictest sense): it 
tends to be seen as legal, although it should not be considered as a real contract of mandate, 
being, actually, a will. In this respect, the latest doctrine (N. Di Staso, Il mandato, cit., 685) 
has considered the post mortem mandate expression as imprecise as it does not fully embrace 
the juridical complexity of the legal instruments it intends to cover. 
11  On the new Italian reverse mortgage, see A. Pagano (a cura di), Novità normative. Rassegna 
di legislazione, in Corriere giuridico, 2016, IV, 458 ff.; M. Procopio (a cura di), Novità 
legislative. Rassegna di legislazione, in Diritto e pratica tributaria, 2016, II.1, 672 ff.; A. 
Chianale, L’inutilità dell’ipoteca nel ‘prestito vecchietti’, in Notariato, 2016, 358 ff.; 
S. Cherti, Prime note sulle modifiche alla disciplina del prestito vitalizio ipotecario, in 
Corriere giuridico, 2015, VIII-IX, 1099 ff.; T. Rumi, La nuova disciplina del prestito vitalizio 
ipotecario, in I Contratti, 2015, X, 937 ff. For some reflections before the entry into force 
of the Law 44/2015, see G. Gigliotti, Il prestito vitalizio ipotecario: un ‘reverse mortgage’ 
all’italiana?, in Il Corriere del Merito, 2011, VII, 677; R. Rinaldi - A. Varrati, Credito 
e Imprese - Lo sviluppo del prestito ipotecario vitalizio in Italia: potenzialità e problemi 
normativi, in Bancaria, 2007, III, 65; A. Iuliani, Il prestito vitalizio ipotecario nel nuovo 
‘sistema’ delle garanzie reali, in Le Nuove leggi civili commentate, 2016, IV, 717 ff.
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As regards this legislation, what is important to emphasize here is the power 
given to the financing institution – unless the borrower or his heirs repaid the loan 
not later than 12 months after the sale of the house or the debtor’s death – to sell the 
property at the market price and to keep any amounts derived from the sale until the 
total extinction of the debt. All this is without prejudice to the obligation to pay any 
surplus to the heirs (or to those entitled).
Beyond the details, all the above elements make it possible to state, as already 
underlined by the latest doctrine12, that a rational and more efficient reconstruction 
of the new regulations shows that the true nature of the reverse mortgage is that of a 
mandate to sell the property after the debtor’s death13. 
The proposed procedure implies that, on the one hand, although having the 
right, no bank will ever proceed to forced execution in order to enforce its pre-
emption rights (the financing institution can indeed directly exercise the power to 
sell the property); on the other, it leads to the non-application of the normal mandate 
rules (which would sanction the extinguishment of the power of representation 
after the sale of the property to third parties by the mandator).14 In this regard, for 
example Chianale stated that the mechanism of the reverse mortgage is not based 
on the mortgage, but rather on the legal mandate with representation assigned to the 
bank in rem propriam and, therefore, irrevocable and also to be exercised after the 
debtor’s death.15 
So, the structure of such a contract reveals not only a financial nature of a post 
mortem mandate (which is in itself sufficient to demonstrate the mortis causa nature 
of the mandate16), but also the impossibility for the borrower to revoke the bank’s 
power to sell the property. All these features shall suggest a high similarity between 
the prestito vitalizio ipotecario and a forbidden succession pact.
A further factor linked to the possibility of considering the Italian reverse 
mortgage as a succession agreement derives from the rule that prevents the 
financing institution from demanding reimbursement of the loan only as long as the 
mortgaged property remains part of the borrower’s estate.
The above rule seems to hint that the legislator has given the bank a real right 
over an object understood as part of the id quod superest. 
This gives me reason to expect that the prestito vitalizio ipotecario, in 
accordance with the objective criterion – based on the evaluation of the object of the 
contract in question, to determine whether or not it is part of the id quod superest – 
should be considered as a void succession agreement17. 
12  A. Chianale, L’inutilità, cit., 358 ff.
13  See E. Buda, Mandato e trasferimento immobiliare, in I Contratti, 2016, III, 267 ff.
14  Indeed, the bank can exercise its power to sell the property in any case of breach, including 
the sale of the property to third parties.
15  A. Chianale, L’inutilità, cit., 360.
16  See G. Capozzi, Successioni, cit., 62 ff.
17  See G. Giampiccolo, Il contenuto atipico del testamento. Contributo ad una teoria dell’atto 
di ultima volontà, Milano, 1954, 233.
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In fact, today, the transfers of goods considered to form part of the remaining 
assets (id quod superest) are held to be void.
In the light of all this, I believe that the Italian legislator, giving this structure 
to the reverse mortgage, has created a new legal derogation from article 458 cod. 
civ.18. I think that the reverse mortgage is indeed a mortis causa mandate which, in 
accordance with the principles established by the doctrine and the case-law, should 
be an example of void succession agreement.
3. TOWARDS THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW IN THE FIELD OF AGREEMENTS AS TO 
SUCCESSION?
Although it is clear that the contrast between the reverse mortgage and the 
basic principles and rules of the Italian civil law is due to a non-well thoughtful legal 
transplant of Common law models19, I feel that the difficulty of incorporating the 
reverse mortgage into the Italian legal categories provides an additional spur for a 
partial rethinking of some legal dogma hampering the flexibility that is increasingly 
needed in order to incorporate legal instruments that are being conceived within the 
framework of the European private law20.
The Italian ban of succession agreements is certainly one of these dogmas, 
especially since the entry into force of the Regulation 659/2012, in which the agre-
ements as to succession are mentioned as parts of a common European succession 
law. 
Although no generally applicable rules have been fixed, the Regulation 
provides a definition of “agreement as to succession” and implicitly expresses 
the hope that the new European succession law may promote the validity of the 
agreements as to succession.
Art. 49 Reg. 650/2012 defines an agreement as to succession as «a type of 
disposition of property upon death the admissibility and acceptance of which 
vary among the Member States». To make it easier for succession rights acquired 
because of an agreement as to succession to be accepted in the Member States, art. 
49 Reg. 650/2012 stipulates that the «Regulation should determine which law is 
to govern the admissibility of such agreements, their substantive validity and their 
binding effects between the parties, including the conditions for their dissolution». 
18  I would like to underline that the same reasoning could cover the trust. See U. Carnevali, 
Negozio fiduciario e mandato ‘post mortem’. Nota a Trib. Milano 18 aprile 1974, in 
Giurisprudenza commerciale, 1975, V.2, 694 ff.
19  See A. Chianale, L’inutilità, cit., 359. For some reflections on this point before the entry into 
force of the Law 44/2015, see D. Cerini, Il prestito vitalizio ipotecario: ‘legal transplant’ in 
cerca di definizione, in Diritto ed economia dell’assicurazione, 2006, II, 503 ff.
20  It is generally accepted that, in the present context, the various categories are starting to 
collapse more and more rapidly and more and more often, and the new realities forcibly 
replace the existing ones. On this issue, I share the hopes expressed by N. Lipari, Le categorie 
del diritto civile, Milano, 2013, passim.
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The objective of facilitating recognition of succession rights acquired thanks to 
an agreement as to succession in a Member State was also evident in the ‘Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments 
in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession’21. 
In fact, recital 20 of the Proposal stated that «in order to facilitate recognition of 
succession rights acquired in a Member State, the conflict-of-laws rule should favour 
the validity of the agreements as to succession by accepting alternative connecting 
factors. The legitimate expectations of third parties should be preserved». 
As the current European trend shows that where future succession pacts are 
banned, Member States should consider allowing such covenants, an amendment of 
the applicable national rules appears necessary especially for countries such as Italy, 
whose laws do not allow succession agreements.22 
In such a scenario, it is my belief that, in view of the harmonisation of the 
European private law, both a historical and comparative point of view merit equal 
importance. Considering that Roman law – as stated by the latest doctrine – «is 
thinking, it is a cultivated science, it is a logic proceeding, a useful model which 
today can be followed not much (and not only) to force its cases, its solutions, its 
institutes in an unsuited social and economic context, but to rediscover the creative 
power of legal science»23, into the Roman scientia iuris some universally recognised 
legal principle shall be found. 
But the prerequisite for such a research is to be, as far as possible, independent 
from all those «meta-historical ideas and teleology that are, today still, and 
especially in civil law systems, advocated by many scholars as the justification for 
constructions that aim at decoding the culture, institutions, techniques and ideologies 
of the ancients (Romans, Greeks, ‘barbarians’) using categories, principles, values 
that are completely alien to those worlds».24
Following the methodological procedure outlined, with this paper I am trying 
to demonstrate that the archetype of the admissibility of succession agreements 
could be found also in the ancient Roman law25: notwithstanding the general 
21  Brussels, 14.10.2009, COM 2009/154 final, COD 2009/0157. The full text of the Proposal 
can be found on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0154:F
IN:EN:PDF. 
22  Art. 458 cod. civ.: «Fatto salvo quanto disposto dagli articoli 768-bis e seguenti, è nulla ogni 
convenzione con cui taluno dispone della propria successione. È del pari nullo ogni atto col 
quale taluno dispone dei diritti che gli possono spettare su una successione non ancora aperta, 
o rinunzia ai medesimi».
23  C. Pelloso, The concept of ‘bargain’ and the (un-)bridgeable gulf between Common Law 
and Civil Law. Some historical observations on the Europeanization of the Law of Contract, 
in RGDR, XIX, 2012, 37 f.
24  C. Pelloso, The concept, cit., 35.
25  And not only in the German tradition, as assumed by the prevailing doctrine. See, for 
example, B. Windscheid, Diritto delle Pandette, III, trad. it., Torino, 1930, 105, nt. 2; B. 
Biondi, Istituti fondamentali di diritto ereditario romano, Milano, 1946, 124 ss.; Id., Diritto 
ereditario romano. Parte generale. (Corso di lezioni), Milano, 1954, 170; P. Voci, Diritto 
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understanding that the prohibition of succession pacts may be traced back to the 
ancient Romans, my research aims at pointing out that a clear stance against mortis 
causa attributions resulting from bilateral agreements cannot be found in the 
classical legal thought.
From this perspective, as Roman law cannot be regarded only as our past, 
but it is also «the memory of our future»26, it seems possible to ‘use’ the concepts 
arising from the casuistry of the Digest not only to rediscover our very deep legal 
roots, but also to reinterpret some current legal issues.27
4. THE MANDATUM POST MORTEM
Against this background, I have studied the post mortem mandatoris mandate 
in Roman legal sources and I found that, maybe, the European trend (allowing more 
widely the conclusion of future succession pacts) is not contrary to our common 
judicial culture rooted in Roman law.28
So far as the mandatum post mortem in Roman law is concerned, my firm 
belief, indeed, is that such consensual contract could be considered as a succession 
agreement. 
Even though no “succession agreement” category had been theorized in 
Roman law, jurists’ writings could provide some guidelines (which Emilio Betti 
would define as ‘enlightening inspirational principle’29) suggesting a jurists’ stance 
ereditario romano, I, Introduzione. Parte generale, Milano, 1960, 475 ss.; P. Bonfante, 
Corso di diritto romano, VI, Le successioni. Parte generale, Milano, 1974, 212; C. Fadda, 
Concetti fondamentali del diritto ereditario romano, I, Milano, 1949, 315 ff.; S. Solazzi, 
Diritto ereditario romano. (Anno accademico 1931-32), Napoli, 1932, 237 ff.; R. Bonini, 
‘Interrogationes’ forensi e attività legislativa giustinianea, in SDHI, XXXIII, 1967, 286; 
M. Sič (Szűcs), L’eredità futura come oggetto del contratto (patto) nel diritto classico e 
postclassico, in RIDA III S., LIX, 2012, 203.
26  C. Pelloso, The concept, cit., 38. See also L. Garofalo, Scienza giuridica, Europa, Stati: 
una dialettica incessante, in Giurisprudenza romana e diritto privato europeo, Padova, 2008, 
1 ff. 
27  As R.C. Van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and the Future, Cambridge, 2002, 36, 
said, «when I look at the present, I am a pessimist, but when I look at the past I am an 
optimist».
28  For the important role played by the Roman Legal tradition in the context of the introduction 
process of a new European private law, see the recent essays of T. dalla Massara, New 
Europe-Old Values? Reform and Perseverance. Can Roman Legal Tradition Play a 
Role of Identity Factor Towards a New Europe?, in New Europe - Old Values? Reform 
and Perseverance, edited by N. Bodiroga-Vukobrat, S. Rodin and G.G. Sander, Rijeka - 
Luxembourg - Ludwigsburg, 2016, 1 ff., and of C. Pelloso, The concept, cit., 1 ff.
29  See E. Betti, Diritto romano e dogmatica odierna, in Questioni di metodo. Diritto romano 
e dogmatica odierna, Como, 1996, 31 f.: «nella ricerca delle singole soluzioni essi (i giuristi 
romani) non sogliono fare applicazione consapevole di principi. Bene spesso la soluzione 
viene trovata di intuito e, in apparenza, balza fuori quasi per caso. C’è bensì, alla sua base, un 
principio ispiratore che la illumina: ma questo – lungi dal venir enunciato – resta nell’ombra 
come latente nella coscienza del giurista». 
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on the post mortem topic that could be analysed within the framework of the current 
legal dogma.
I shall not dwell on all the legal sources I studied. Basically, I have noted 
that Roman jurists, as shown by Paraphrasis Graeca Institutionum 3.19.16: Et 
post mortem alterius concepta stipulatio valebat etiam apud veteres; veluti si quis 
dixerit: spondeo dare tibi decem aureos post mortem Titii; cum accidere potest, 
vivis adhuc contrahentibus, Titium mori, did envisage the possibility to conclude 
a stipulatio taking effect after the death of a person other than the stipulator or the 
promisor.
Problems arose in case the contract was to produce its effect after the death of 
one of the parties. 
The texts I consulted did not seem to entirely exclude the possibility of making 
a legal act subject to the time clause of one of the parties’ death. 
A blocking issue could derive from the enforcement of a principle set by Paul. 
12 ad Sab. D. 45.1.46.1: Id autem, quod in facto est, in mortis tempus conferri non 
potest, veluti: ‘cum morieris, Alexandriam venire spondes’, i.e. the impossibility of 
foreseeing a facere by the debitor mortuus, or from the inevitable conflict between 
this time clause and the legal structure of the legal act, for example the impossibility 
of establishing a usufruct after the death of the usufructuary, as maintained by 
Paolo: Paul. 3 ad Sab. D. 33.2.5: Usum fructum ‘cum moriar’ inutiliter stipulor: 
idem est in legato, quia et constitutus usus fructus morte intercidere solet.
It is in the light of these principles that I think that also the main source on 
mandatum post mortem should be considered:
Gai 3.158: item si quis quid post mortem meam faciendum mihi mandet, inutile 
mandatum est, quia generaliter placuit ab heredis persona obligationem incipere 
non posse.
From this text, the prevailing doctrine assumed that the mandatum post 
mortem was totally invalid in Roman law.30
However, contrary to the prevalent opinion, since Gaio’s words only refer to 
mandatum post mortem mandatarii, and accordingly to the principles arising from 
other fragments (as those I mentioned before), I think that this fragment proves the 
only invalidity of the mandatum post mortem mandatarii (it is impossible to charge 
someone with doing something after his death), but that the text does not hinder the 
validity of the mandatum post mortem mandatoris.31
30  V. Arangio-Ruiz, Il mandato in diritto romano. Corso di lezioni svolto nell’Università di 
Roma. Anno 1948 – 1949, Napoli, 1949, 142 ff.; G. Castelli, Alcune osservazioni giuridiche 
sull’epitaffio di ‘Allia Potestas’, in Scritti giuridici, a cura di E. Albertario con prefazione 
di P. Bonfante, Milano, 1923, 111 f.; S. Di Marzo, Sul mandato ‘post mortem’, in Scritti 
in onore di C. Ferrini, I, Milano, 1947, 234; S. Perozzi, Istituzioni di diritto romano2, II, 
Bologna, 1927, 310, nt. 2.
31  On this matter, I agree with C. Sanfilippo, ‘Mandatum post mortem’, in Studi in onore di S. 
Solazzi, Napoli, 1948, 556.
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5.  A LEGAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN CONTRACT AND 
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION
Based on this assumption, here I would like to dwell on another fundamental 
issue for my research. 
Firstly, it is necessary to point out the difference between the mandatum post 
mortem (understood as a contract) and other testamentary dispositions defined as 
mandatum post mortem as well. The two instruments are sometimes confused with 
one another, because of the ambiguous terminology found in classical sources. This 
confusion has been a hindrance for a correct analysis of the mandatum post mortem. 
For example, Pietro Bonfante stated that mandatum post mortem was not a 
contract, but rather a testamentary disposition because the mandate should not be 
considered as a contractual relationship, while it could be conceived in theory as a 
mandate mortis causa, i.e. a testamentary disposition.32
As you can expect, the choice on the perspective to be adopted (i.e. whether the 
contractual or the testamentary perspective) is the premise for my entire research, 
because I am trying to investigate the importance of the post mortem mandatoris 
mandate as an index of a hereditary system including also bilateral agreements. If I 
had not contested Bonfante’s opinion, I would have implicitly accepted the nature 
of the mandatum post mortem as a testamentary disposition, thus excluding the post 
mortem mandate as a valid “source of inspiration” for my research.
For this reason, I deemed necessary to express an opinion on this matter.
It is therefore obvious that the term ‘mandatum’ in legal sources not only 
indicates a consensual contract33, but could also designate more generally the 
concepts of ‘order’, ‘proxy’, ‘assignment’, ‘authorization’34. Furthermore, normal 
practice was that the testator often included in his/her will the so called ‘atypical’ 
dispositions in order to instruct somebody different from the heirs to organise 
the testator’s funeral. This is corroborated by Ulp. 25 ad ed. D.11.7.12.4, which 
indicates the list of people who were to funus facere35. 
32  For P. Bonfante, Mandato ‘post mortem’, in Scritti giuridici varii, III, Obbligazioni e 
possesso, Torino, 1926, 270 f., the mandatum post mortem was «una volontà estrinsecata dal 
subietto perché debba valere dopo la morte, senza reciproco scambio di dichiarazioni, senza 
accordo di parti: si tratta, in breve di un atto mortis causa. I principi del sistema contrattuale, 
gli adagi pericolosi, mandatum morte finitur, obligatio ab heredis persona, ecc., sono fuori 
questione».
33  See F. Pringsheim, L’origine des contrats consensuels, in RHD, XXXII, 1954, 494.
34  For an extensive bibliography about the etymology of the term mandatum and the concept 
of mandare in Roman law, see S. Randazzo, ‘Mandare’. Radici della doverosità e percorsi 
consensualistici nell’evoluzione del mandato romano, Milano, 2005, 7 ff. 
35  See Ulp. 25 ad ed. D.11.7.12.4: Funus autem eum facere oportet, quem decedens elegit: sed 
si non ille fecit, nullam esse huius rei poenam, nisi aliquid pro hoc emolumentum ei relictum 
est: tunc enim, si non paruerit voluntati defuncti, ab hoc repellitur. sin autem de hac re 
defunctus non cavit, nec ulli delegatum id munus est, scriptos heredes ea res contingit: si 
nemo scriptus est, legitimos vel cognatos: quosque suo ordine quo succedunt. On the burial 
expenses as a statutory obligation on the hereditas, see S. Di Salvo, Il legato modale in 
diritto romano, Napoli, 1973, 132.
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In those cases, the terms used to convey the concept of ‘assignment’ included 
the word mandatum.
So, I found particularly interesting a passage by Ulpiano where the term 
mandare is used in a testamentary context:
Ulp. 25 ad ed. D. 11.7.14.2: Si cui funeris sui curam testator mandaverit et ille 
accepta pecunia funus non duxerit, de dolo actionem in eum dandam Mela scripsit: 
credo tamen et extra ordinem eum a praetore compellendum funus ducere.
In this case, a testator gave a mandatum to someone in order to organise his 
funeral using a sum of money the testator have left him for this purpose. Since the 
funeral was not organised, the jurist Mela gave the actio doli to the heirs, against 
the person instructed by the testator, while Ulpiano indicates the possibility of a 
praetor’s ex officio intervention.
This text generated confusion, as it led for example Andreas Wacke to state 
that the mandatum post mortem mandatoris was invalid36: the impossibility of 
concluding a valid mandatum post mortem agreement would have made the agere 
ex mandato impossible, thus making the actio doli the only actio available. 
On the contrary however, I think that the expression si mandaverit does not 
resemble the consensual contract, given the ambiguous use of the term mandatum in 
Roman legal sources, as I mentioned before37.
In my opinion, the main element showing that the text does not fall within the 
contractual framework is the term testator: therefore, most probably, the source of 
obligation of the supposed ‘mandatary’ was, actually, a will38. 
It is clear that the actio mandati is to be excluded, as it is impossible to bring 
an ex contractu action, as actio mandati is, for the performance of a contract that 
has never been concluded.
In contradiction with Wacke’s opinion, however, I have found out that other 
sources referring to mandatum post mortem do refer to actio mandati, to agere 
mandati or to iudicium mandati. See for example:
Ulp. 31 ad ed. D. 17.1.12.17: Idem Marcellus scribit, si, ut post mortem sibi 
monumentum fieret, quis mandavit, heres eius poterit mandati agere. illum vero 
qui mandatum suscepit, si sua pecunia fecit, puto agere mandati, si non ita ei 
mandatum est, ut sua pecunia faceret monumentum. potuit enim agere etiam cum 
eo qui mandavit, ut sibi pecuniam daret, ad faciendum, maxime si iam quaedam ad 
faciendum paravit. 
Gai. 10 ad ed. prov. D. 17.1.13: Idem est et si mandavi tibi, ut post mortem 
meam heredibus meis emeres fundum.
Gai 3.117: Sponsores quidem et fidepromissores et fideiussores saepe solemus 
accipere, dum curamus, ut diligentius nobis cautum sit; adstipulatorem uero fere 
36  A. Wacke, Sul concetto di ‘dolus’ nell’‘actio de dolo’, in Iura, XXVIII, 1997, 30.
37  This opinion is also expressed by C. Sanfilippo, Ancora un caso, cit., 2051.
38  The text falls within the testamentary context also for J.L. Murga Gener, Las practicas 
consuetudinarias en torno al ‘bonum animae’ en el derecho romano tardio, in SDHI, XXXIV, 
1968, 172, nt. 186. 
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tunc solum adhibemus, cum ita stipulamur, ut aliquid post mortem nostram detur; 
quia enim ut ita nobis detur stipulando nihil agimus, adhibetur adstipulator, ut is 
post mortem nostram agat; qui si quid fuerit consecutus, de restituendo eo mandati 
iudicio heredi meo tenetur. 
Ulp. 31 ad ed. D. 17.1.12.16: Si mandavero exigendam pecuniam, deinde 
voluntatem mutavero, an sit mandati actio vel mihi vel heredi meo? et ait Marcellus 
cessare mandati actionem, quia extinctum est mandatum finita voluntate. quod 
si mandaveris exigendam, deinde prohibuisti, exactamque recepisti, debitor 
liberabitur. 
As it is possible to notice, when reference is made to an action of a contractual 
nature (as actio mandati), no reference is made to the will nor to the testator.
When analysed from the procedural point of view, these two elements are 
consistent: on the one hand, in cases like D.11.7.14.2, reference to the testator is 
made, and therefore, it should be no surprise that the actio mandati is refused; on 
the other, in other fragments, the actio mandati is granted and this goes to show that 
there were cases of ‘contractual’ mandatum post mortem. 
As a matter of fact, broad the mandatum concept might have been, in the case 
of consensual contract, any ‘pathological’ element of the legal relationship should 
have been analysed and solved within the framework of a iudicium mandati, and the 
existence of legal sources proving the use of actio mandati for the performance of 
mandatum post mortem shows that it was an actual contract. 
6. DE DOLO ACTIONEM IN EUM DANDAM MELA SCRIPSIT
As far as the actio doli mentioned by Ulpiano in D.11.7.14.2 is concerned, I 
think that Mela granted actio doli for the following reason: through a condictio or 
an actio in factum, the claimant could have obtained only a pecuniary compensation 
from the defendant39. 
Conversely, by introducing the iudicium de dolo and thanks to the arbitratus 
de restituendo40 in the actio doli’s formula41, heirs could have expected that, in order 
39  The connection between the patrimonial nature of all convictions in Roman civil law process 
and the arbitratus de restituendo is clearly explained by M. Marrone, Istituzioni di diritto 
romano3, Palermo, 2006 (rist. Palermo, 2011), 95, nt. 77: «il ricorso alla clausola arbitraria va 
messo in relazione col principio per cui la condanna doveva essere sempre espressa in denaro, 
e ne rappresentava un evidente temperamento; un temperamento che giovava di norma sia al 
convenuto – che avrebbe evitato la condanna al pagamento di una somma di denaro di cui 
poteva non disporre – sia all’attore, che avrebbe conseguito direttamente l’oggetto della sua 
pretesa».
40  For a recent and wide analysis on arbitratus de restituendo, see S. Viaro, L’‘arbitratus 
de restituendo’ nelle formule del processo privato romano, Napoli, 2012, passim; M. 
Talamanca, voce Processo civile (dir. rom.), in Enc. dir., XXXVI, Milano, 1987, 66; C.A. 
Cannata, Profilo istituzionale del processo privato romano, II, Il processo formulare, Torino, 
1982, 107; E. Betti, Istituzioni di diritto romano, I2, Padova, 1942, 297.
41  A different opinion about the presence of the arbitratus in the actio doli’s formula is in B. 
Biondi, Studi sulle ‘actiones arbitrariae’ e l’‘arbitrium iudicis’, Palermo, 1912, 83. 
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to avoid conviction and the infamia42 (which was a consequence of the criminal 
nature43 of actio doli44), the accipiens would decide to remedy its breach of good 
faith and use the money already accepted for the specific purpose set by the de 
cuius. 
As a matter of fact, unlike all the other actions, the actio dolis indirectly gave 
the possibility of obtaining a specific compensation, and maybe this was sufficient 
for Mela (who lived in an age45 when the only civil law process known was the 
per formulas one, where the only kind of conviction available was the pecuniary 
compensation) to consider that also the main pre-requisite to bring the actio doli 
was present, i.e. the subsidiarity, to be understood – in my opinion – not as ‘lack 
of judicial remedies available’, but rather as ‘impossibility to reach a particular 
protection goal’. 
In this case, it is clear that the main objective was to identify a legal instrument 
to get to the specific compensation, i.e. the holding of the funeral by the defendant46. 
I think this is proved in particular by the last part of the text, where Ulpiano (who 
lived approximately two centuries after Mela, when the civil law process allowed 
new means of protection introduced by the cognitio extra ordinem47) indicates the 
possibility of a praetor’s ex officio intervention aimed at compelling the person cui 
funeris sui curam testator mandaverit to funus ducere.
42  The actio doli was one of the few actiones in personam containing the arbitratus de 
restituendo in the formula, and probably – as said by P. Lambrini, Dolo generale e regole di 
correttezza, Padova, 2010, 72 – «la presenza dell’arbitratus de restituendo sembra si debba 
spiegare come un’ultima chance per permettere al convenuto di evitare l’infamia».
43  However, the actio doli is commonly defined as ‘la meno penale delle azioni penali’; see L. 
Vacca, Delitti privati e azioni penali nel principato, in ANRW, II, 14, Berlin - New York, 
1982, 702; G. Rossetti, Problemi e prospettive in tema di ‘struttura’ e ‘funzione’ delle azioni 
penali private, in BIDR, XXXV-XXXVI, 1993-1994, 343 ff.; P. Voci, Azioni penali e azioni 
miste, in SDHI, LXIV, 1998, 1 ff.
44  On the controversial and ignominious nature of the actio doli, see á. d’Ors, Una nueva lista 
de acciones infamantes, in ‘Sodalitas’. Scritti in onore di A. Guarino, VI, Napoli, 1984, 2575 
ff.; J.M. Blanch, Nota a próposito de la ‘actio de dolo’ y su carácter infamante, in Estudios 
en homenaje al profesor J. Iglesias, III, Madrid, 1988, 1151.
45  See C. Ferrini, Saggi intorno ad alcuni giureconsulti romani, in Opere di C. Ferrini, II, 
Studi sulle fonti del diritto romano, Milano, 1929, 11 ff.
46  As noted also by G. MacCormack, ‘Dolus’ in Republican Law, in BIDR, LXXXVIII, 1985, 
34, «the specific mention of accepta pecunia suggests that the receipt of the expenses was 
relevant for the determination of the dolus», as «it was not just the failure to carry out the 
undertaking but the receipt of the money and the subsequent failure to arrange the funeral 
that constituted dolus».
47  See M. Marrone, Istituzioni, cit., 113.
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7. THE ROMAN MANDATUM POST MORTEM AND ITS 
POSSIBLE ECONOMIC NATURE
After having demonstrated that the presence of some testamentary provisions 
defined as mandatum post mortem does not exclude the existence of other cases of 
mandatum post mortem contracts, enforced by the actio mandati, I would like to 
introduce a source which – I think – shows that Roman law allowed agreements 
that, most probably, would be considered today void succession agreements.
That is:
Gai. 10 ad ed. prov. D. 17.1.13: Idem est et si mandavi tibi, ut post mortem 
meam heredibus meis emeres fundum.
Here Gaio talks about a mandatum post mortem where the mandator instructed 
the mandatary to buy a land for the mandator’s heir after the mandator’s death. 
First, I had to put the text in context: since the incipit idem est recalls an 
arrangement that is not made clear by Gaio’s words, I had to look at the preceding 
passage:
Ulp. 31 ad ed. D. 17.1.12.17: Idem Marcellus scribit, si, ut post mortem sibi 
monumentum fieret, quis mandavit, heres eius poterit mandati agere. illum vero 
qui mandatum suscepit, si sua pecunia fecit, puto agere mandati, si non ita ei 
mandatum est, ut sua pecunia faceret monumentum. potuit enim agere etiam cum 
eo qui mandavit, ut sibi pecuniam daret, ad faciendum, maxime si iam quaedam ad 
faciendum paravit. 
Gai. 10 ad ed. prov. D. 17.1.13: Idem est et si mandavi tibi, ut post mortem 
meam heredibus meis emeres fundum.
In the order of the Digest, the incipit idem est (which can be translated as 
‘likewise’, ‘in the same way’) refers to the preceding passage by Ulpiano which 
grants the actio mandati to manage the binding relationship between the mandatary 
and the mandator’s heirs deriving from a mandatum post mortem. 
Idem est, therefore, hints at the possibility of requiring performance of 
a contract where the mandator instructed the mandatary to buy a land for the 
mandator’s heir after the mandator’s death, and it seems to me that the patrimonial 
nature of this contract is clear.
However, the two texts include fragments written by two different jurists (one 
is Gaio and the other is Ulpiano) and, therefore, certainly, when using idem est, 
Gaio did not refer to Ulpiano.
Then, I verified the reconstruction of the correct order that can be found in 
Lenel’s Palingenesia:
Gai. 9 ad ed. prov. (D. 17.1.27) 
(pr.) Si quis alicui scripserit, ut debitorem suum liberet, seque eam pecuniam, 
quam is debuerit, soluturum, mandati actione tenetur.
(1.) Si servum ea lege tibi tradidero, ut eum post mortem meam manumitteres, 
constitit obligatio: potest autem et in mea quoque persona agendi causa intervenire, 
veluti si paenitentia acta servum reciperare velim. Idem est et si mandavi tibi, ut 
post mortem meam heredibus meis emeres fundum.
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When analysing the topics dealt with by Gaio in the 9 Comment Book ad 
edictum provinciale, I found confirmation of the reference to the procedural data, as 
the preceding passage, in the original order, contains several hypotheses of mandate 
and granting of the contractual action: the actio mandati.
From Gai. 10 ad ed. prov. D. 17.1.13 we can therefore deduce not only the 
possibility of agere ex mandato to perform a mandatum post mortem, but also and 
mostly the eligibility, in Roman law, of contracts that, in applying Italian civil law, 
would be considered today void mortis causa mandates.
8. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
Thus, looking at the typical “procedural law-reasoning” of the Roman jurists, 
the following conclusions may be drawn.
On the one hand, the legal sources envisage the possibility of bringing a 
iudicium mandati for the performance of a post mortem mandate, and this goes 
to show the existence of a contractual post mortem mandate; on the other, there 
were Roman law cases, like that of Gaio in D.17.1.13, proving the existence of 
bilateral agreements intended to fulfil a patrimonial function casually related to the 
mandator’s death.
In this respect, an interesting example for my study is set by an Italian case 
challenged before the Genova Court of Appeal in 194748. The Court declared the 
invalidity of a bank deposit of bearer securities where the depositor charged the 
Bank to distribute those securities according to his instructions after his death. The 
Court’s decision was taken because of the patrimonial function of the agreement 
(perceived as a mortis causa mandate) and, therefore, of the non-compliance with 
art. 458 cod. civ.
Such arrangement, still considered void in compliance with the Italian 
prohibition of succession agreements, shall fall within the framework of the legal 
act described by Gaio, although the outcomes differ.
Moreover, about the recent introduction of the reverse mortgage in the Italian 
legal system, the clear patrimonial nature of this new type of loan, containing an 
irrevocable mandate to sell the property after the death of the borrower/mandator, 
shows that the Italian legislator has opted for a legal transaction maybe closer to the 
Gaio’s solution than to the Genova Court of Appeal’s one. 
Ultimately, in the framework of the gradual process leading to the creation of 
a ‘Common European private law’, the case of the Roman post mortem mandatum 
seems to hint that the Roman legal experience might represent, also in the field 
of the agreements as to succession, a good instrument for reaching a European 
legal “palingenesis”49, which must get over the present discrepancies, to recover 
48  App. Genova, 19.6.1947, in Monitore tribunali, 1948, 48.
49  See L. Garofalo, Una nuova dogmatica per il diritto privato europeo, in Giurisprudenza, 
cit., 45 ff.
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the essence of the Roman scientia iuris50 as a «rational reflection, a creation of a 
spirit, free from the often oppressing bonds of a positive power, either legislative or 
judicial».51 
The concepts emerged from the sources considered in this paper apparently do 
not evoke any hostility towards any bilateral agreements intended to govern some 
aspects relevant to the inheritance.
Consequently, as long as the understanding of Roman Law remains far from 
«the mirage of the placeless and timeless ‘Roman-Pandectist’»52, the study of the 
Roman post mortem mandatum shall add a “letter” to the “conceptual alphabet”53, 
written by the Roman jurists, where the modern jurist could also be able to find 
certain fundamental values on which the European culture of private law is based.54
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Maria Federica Merotto55*
Sažetak
PRESTITO VITALIZIO IPOTECARIO I MANDATUM POST 
MORTEM:
DVA PRIMJERA VALJANIH UGOVORA O NASLJEĐIVANJU 
IZMEĐU PROŠLOSTI I SADAŠNJOSTI
U radu se analizira mandatum post mortem u rimskom i talijanskom pravu 
kao pravni posao koji služi zaštiti interesa koji nastaju nakon smrti davatelja 
mandata. Glede sadašnjeg prava, uzimajući u obzir dominantno stajalište dok-
trine, koja smatra mandatum post mortem s imovinskim sadržajem ništetnim, 
budući da je u suprotnosti s člankom 458. talijanskoga Građanskog zakonika, 
analizirat će se osnovna obilježja instituta prestito vitalizio ipotecario radi uspo-
redbe kompatibilnosti tog nedavno uvedenog instituta sa zabranom ugovora o 
nasljeđivanju koji je još uvijek na snazi u Italiji. Istraživanje će se provesti i na 
razini rimskog prava. nakon dokazivanja da se mandatum post mortem, shvaćen 
kao ugovor, razlikuje od drugih oporučnih raspolaganja, premda isto nazivanih 
mandatum post mortem, autorica uzima u obzir jedan izvor (Gai 10 ad ed. D. 
17.1.13) koji bi mogao utvrditi postojanje takvih ugovornih mandata post mortem 
imovinskog sadržaja i u rimskom pravnom sustavu.
Ključne riječi: mandatum post mortem, ugovor o nasljeđivanju, prestito  
 vitalizio ipotecario, europsko privatno pravo, mantadum  
 mortis causa, rimsko pravo, oporučno raspolaganje.
Zusammenfassung
PRESTITIO VITALIZIO IPOTECARIO UND MANDATUM POST 
MORTEM:
ZWEI BEISPIELE GÜLTIGER ERBVERTRÄGE IN 
VERGANGENHEIT UND GEGENWART
Diese Arbeit basiert auf das Mandat post mortem, welches ein Vertrag zum 
Schutz mancher nach dem Tod des Mandants entstandenen Interessen sowohl 
im italienischen als auch im römischen Rechtssystem darstellt. Da der neuesten 
Doktrin nach das Mandat post mortem, bei welchem die Aufgaben des Mandants 
wirtschaftlicher Natur sind, als ungültig betrachtet wurde, weil es nicht in Einklang 
mit Art. 458 des italienischen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches steht, schlägt diese 
Arbeit vor, dass der neulich eingeführte Begriff der „umgekehrten Hypothek“ 
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im italienischen Rechtssystem ein neuer Schritt zur Überwindung des Verbots 
von Erbverträgen darstellen kann. Die Arbeit analysiert die aktuelle italienische 
Gesetzgebung und die des Europäischen Privatrechtes. Anschließend wird der 
Begriff mandatum post mortem aus dem römischem Recht analysiert, wobei gezeigt 
wird, dass ein solcher Konsensualvertrag als Erbvertrag angesehen werden kann. Im 
nächsten Teil der Arbeit wird der Unterschied zwischen dem mandatum post mortem 
(angesehen als Vertrag) und den anderen als mandatum post mortem definierten 
letztwilligen Verfügungen erläutert. Nachfolgend wird die Quelle, welche die 
wirtschaftliche Natur des mandatum post mortem zeigt, in Betracht gezogen, 
wonach abschließend betont wird, dass es im römischen Recht Entscheidungen gibt 
(z.B. die Entscheidung von Gaio in D.17.1.13), welche das Bestehen von bilateralen 
Verträgen, dessen Zweck die Erfüllung von wirtschaftlichen Funktionen nach dem 
Tod des Mandants war, beweisen. 
Schlüsselwörter: mandatum post mortem, Erbverträge, prestito vitalizio  
 ipotecario, Europäisches Privatrecht, mandatum mortis  
 causa, umgekehrte Hypothek im italienischen Recht,   
 mandatum post mortem, Subsidiarität von der actio doli,  
 römisches Recht, letztwillige Verfügungen.
Riassunto
PRESTITO VITALIZIO IPOTECARIO E MANDATUM POST 
MORTEM:
DUE ESEMPI DI PATTI SUCCESSORI VALIDI TRA PRESENTE 
E PASSATO
Il contributo tratta, sia nel diritto italiano che nel diritto romano, del mandato 
post mortem, particolare figura negoziale che si presta ad essere eseguita per tutelare 
interessi che si manifestano dopo la morte del mandante. Con riferimento al diritto 
odierno, tenendo a mente l’opinione della dottrina maggioritaria, che considera un 
mandato post mortem avente contenuto patrimoniale nullo a causa del contrasto con 
l’art. 458 cod. civ., vengono analizzate le principali caratteristiche del prestito vitalizio 
ipotecario al fine di verificare la compatibilità di questo istituto di recente introduzione 
con il divieto di patti successori vigente in Italia. L’indagine si sposta quindi sul piano 
romanistico: dopo aver dimostrato la differenza tra il mandatum post mortem – inteso 
come contratto – e le altre disposizioni testamentarie definite ugualmente ‘mandatum 
post mortem’, viene presa in considerazione una fonte in particolare (Gai 10 ad ed. 
D. 17.1.13) che sembrerebbe attestare l’esistenza, nel sistema giuridico romano, di 
mandati post mortem contrattuali aventi contenuto patrimoniale. 
Parole chiave: mandatum post mortem, patti successori, prestito vitalizio  
 ipotecario, diritto privato europeo, mandatum mortis causa,  
 diritto romano, disposizione testamentaria.
